Comments for H. Akın Ünver http://www.akinunver.com/scholar op-eds, articles and other written works Sat, 22 Oct 2011 01:35:50 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 Comment on Turkey’s ‘Kurdish initiative’: What went wrong? (Or did it?) by Turkey’s ‘Kurdish initiative’: What went wrong? (Or did it?) | Foreign Policy Blogs http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=225&cpage=1#comment-5180 Turkey’s ‘Kurdish initiative’: What went wrong? (Or did it?) | Foreign Policy Blogs Sat, 22 Oct 2011 01:35:50 +0000 http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=225#comment-5180 [...] Originally appeared on: http://www.turkishpolicycenter.com/analysis/an-analysis-by-dr-h-akin-unver/ http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=225 [...] [...] Originally appeared on: http://www.turkishpolicycenter.com/analysis/an-analysis-by-dr-h-akin-unver/ http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=225 [...]

]]> Comment on Post-PKK Operations: Will Turkey Change Its Attitude toward Iran and Syria? by Can Turkey attack Syria? | Foreign Policy Blogs http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=11&cpage=1#comment-5117 Can Turkey attack Syria? | Foreign Policy Blogs Thu, 20 Oct 2011 03:07:39 +0000 http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=11#comment-5117 [...] the shining example of Turkey’s ‘strategic depth’, the Assad regime, as a result of its repression of Syrian dissent, has moved from [...] [...] the shining example of Turkey’s ‘strategic depth’, the Assad regime, as a result of its repression of Syrian dissent, has moved from [...]

]]> Comment on Turkey’s ‘Kurdish initiative’: What went wrong? (Or did it?) by Turkish Blogger Faces 2 Years in Jail for ‘Insulting’ PM Erdoğan « >>İSTANBUL DESPATCH http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=225&cpage=1#comment-4555 Turkish Blogger Faces 2 Years in Jail for ‘Insulting’ PM Erdoğan « >>İSTANBUL DESPATCH Sun, 25 Sep 2011 14:26:07 +0000 http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=225#comment-4555 [...] a retort, the 22-year-old blogger invoked last year’s so-called Kurdish Intiative by Erdoğan’s government, alluding to reported secret talks with the imprisoned leader of the [...] [...] a retort, the 22-year-old blogger invoked last year’s so-called Kurdish Intiative by Erdoğan’s government, alluding to reported secret talks with the imprisoned leader of the [...]

]]> Comment on Turkey’s ‘Kurdish initiative’: What went wrong? (Or did it?) by Turkey’s choice: An early assessment | Turkey http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=225&cpage=1#comment-2718 Turkey’s choice: An early assessment | Turkey Mon, 13 Jun 2011 13:06:59 +0000 http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=225#comment-2718 [...] lost the AKP a considerable portion of the Kurdish votes, reversing the progress it had made in its ‘Kurdish opening’. A Eurasianet report [...] [...] lost the AKP a considerable portion of the Kurdish votes, reversing the progress it had made in its ‘Kurdish opening’. A Eurasianet report [...]

]]> Comment on Turkey’s Invisible Cold War: Islamist and Secular Communalizations by Ozgur Balsoy http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=248&cpage=1#comment-1485 Ozgur Balsoy Sat, 02 Apr 2011 05:09:51 +0000 http://www.akinunver.com/scholar/?p=248#comment-1485 Unease among secularist elite and ordinary Turkish peasants started during and after the Turgut Ozal administration. Having had a closed economy for decades, Turkey for the first time started experiencing benefits of an open and free-market economy. Though, the national debt increased many folds in his terms, he funneled foreign resources to inner parts of Turkey helping small and mid-sized businesses in small towns of Anatolia to get established and build connections abroad. He aimed to establish a social class of <i>ortadirek</i> (middle class) and succeeded with a booming economy, resulting stronger national self-esteem. These were the changes that disturbed secularist elite who had enjoyed for many decades favoritism in every level of the society, government and among the rich. I do not agree with your claim on the case of 'popular polarization' is being new. I would rather say that it is just an ever-growing tension between such groups. Although economic crisis during the 1990s wiped out Turgut Ozal's <i>ortadirek</i>, it has been only after the turn of the millenium and the beginning of the first term of AKP that this ortadirek, small and mid-size businesses started to remember and live again their heydays. Turkish economy enjoys high growth rates for many consecutive years for the last decade owing this to these businesses. I see these clashes as social fault lines within a dynamic and changing society. Turkish peasants have become more educated, richer, and asking their fair share of the social real estate, pushing secularists and Kemalists to corner within a social space once ample but now getting narrower by the day for its previous owners. On another account, I agree with you that such tension must get diffused. No one would get any benefit from it, except those whose survival is only possible through chaos and social clashes. Your "Ergenekon Conundrum" work is quite substantial and deserves a referral right at this point. Unease among secularist elite and ordinary Turkish peasants started during
and after the Turgut Ozal administration. Having had a closed economy for decades,
Turkey for the first time started experiencing benefits of an open and
free-market economy. Though, the national debt increased many folds in his terms,
he funneled foreign resources to inner parts of Turkey helping small and mid-sized
businesses in small towns of Anatolia to get established and build connections abroad.
He aimed to establish a social class of ortadirek (middle class) and succeeded
with a booming economy, resulting stronger national self-esteem.
These were the changes that disturbed secularist elite who had enjoyed for many
decades favoritism in every level of the society, government and among the rich.

I do not agree with your claim on the case of ‘popular polarization’ is being
new. I would rather say that it is just an ever-growing tension between such groups. Although economic crisis during the 1990s wiped out Turgut Ozal’s ortadirek, it has been only after the turn of the millenium and the beginning of the first term of AKP that this ortadirek, small and mid-size businesses started to remember and live again their heydays. Turkish economy enjoys high growth rates for many consecutive years for the last decade owing this to these businesses.

I see these clashes as social fault lines within a dynamic and changing society.
Turkish peasants have become more educated, richer, and asking their fair share of
the social real estate, pushing secularists and Kemalists to corner within a social space
once ample but now getting narrower by the day for its previous owners.

On another account, I agree with you that such tension must get diffused. No one would get any benefit from it, except those whose survival is only possible through
chaos and social clashes. Your “Ergenekon Conundrum” work is quite substantial and
deserves a referral right at this point.

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